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Abstract 
    This paper aims at investigating whether 
application of financial leverage affects firm value of 
electronic listed firms in Taiwan. We employ 
advanced panel threshold regression model to test if 
there exists an optimal Debt/Total Assets ratio (D/TA 
ratio), which may result in threshold effects and 
asymmetrical relationships between the D/TA ratio 
and firm value. ROA, ROE, EPS and Tobing’s q are 
adopted as proxy variables for firm value. The result 
shows that there exists single threshold effect between 
debt ratio and firm value only when Tobing’s q is 
selected as the proxy variable for the firm value. The 
estimated threshold value (γ ) is found to be 37.84% 
and two coefficients ( 1α and2α ) are all positive with 
the evidence that the 1α  in the low debt level is 
significant, while the 2α  in the high debt level is not. 
This suggests that financial managers should use 
financial leverage wisely in order to maximize the 
firm’s value. 
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I Introduction and Literature Review 
     Modern capital structure theory started 
in 1958, when Modigliani and Miller 
?1958?(M&M hereafter) first brought out 
“Capital Structure Irrelevance Theory”, 
advocated that the firm value and weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) is unaffected 
by the financial structure of the firm. 
However, M&M’s perfect market 
assumptions: such as no transaction costs, no 
taxes, symmetric information and identical 
borrowing rates, and risk free debt, are 
contradictory to the operations in the real 
world. Modigliani and Miller (1963) later 
modified their original M&M’s model and 
considered the tax deductibility of interest 
(tax shields effect). According to modified 
M&M theory with taxes, value of levered 
firm equals the value of un-levered plus the 
value of the tax shields. In this case, the more 
the debt in the capital structure, the higher 
will be the value of a levered firm. One can 
always increase firm value by increasing 
leverage, implying a capital structure of 
100% debt is optimal to maximize the firm’s 
value. Miller (1977) further added personal 
taxes to the analysis and demonstrated that 
tax deductibility of interest at the firm level 
is offset by personal income taxes at the 
investor level. 
The extension of M&M and Miller’s 
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model is the trade off theory between the tax 
advantage of debt and various 
leverage-related costs (such as debt-issuing 
costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and 
loss of non-debt tax shields). Direct 
bankruptcy costs include the costs that are 
associated with bankruptcy, such as legal and 
administrative costs. In addition, though 
borrowing saves a firm’s money on its 
corporate taxes, but the more a firm borrows, 
the firm increases its risk causing the firm’s 
bond rating to decrease, and its costs of debt 
to increase. The more likely it is that the firm 
becomes bankrupt and finally even has to pay 
the “bankruptcy tax”. Indirect bankruptcy 
costs include the difficulties of running a 
business that is experiencing financial 
distress. Moreover, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) specified the existence of “agency 
costs” which arise due to the conflicts either 
between managers and shareholders (agency 
costs of equity) or between shareholders and 
debtholders (agency costs of debt).  
In the Static Tradeoff Theory (Myers, 
1977) there is a static or balance amount of 
debt and equity for the manager to decide, by 
analyzing the trade-off between the benefits 
of more debt versus the cost of additional 
debt in the form of financial distress or 
agency costs. Ultimately, finds the “optimal 
capital structure”. This theory suggests that 
value-maximizing financial managers should 
employ capital structures composed of that 
mix of debt and equity for which the interest 
tax shield is equal to the incremental costs 
through debt financing. Kim and Sorensen 
(1986) investigated the presence of the 
agency costs and their relation to the debt 
policy of corporations. It is found that firms 
with higher insider ownership have greater 
debt ratios than firms with lower insider 
ownership, which may be explained by the 
agency costs of debt or the agency costs of 
equity. It is also found that high-growth firms 
use less debt rather than more debt, 
high-operating-risk firms use more debt 
rather than less debt, and firm size seems to 
be uncorrelated to the level of debt.  
Literature concerning about the issue 
of the relationship between financial leverage 
and firm value can be found in Ross (1977), 
Castanias (1983), Altman (1984), Jensen 
(1986), Titman and Wessels (1988), Leland 
and Toft (1996), Burgman (1996), Goldstein, 
Ju and Leland (1998), Philosophov and 
Philosophov (1999), Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999), Chirinko and Singha (2000), 
Morellec (2001), Lie (2002), Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), Welch (2003), Li and Cui 
(2003), and Frank and Goyal (2004) among 
others.  
Taiwan, a typical island-style export-led 
country, is a main supplier of electronics and 
Information Technology (IT) related products 
to the U.S. and the rest of the world. 
Taiwanese economy is now relies more on 
capital-intensive goods than ever. Among 
different industries, Whiting (1991) pointed 
out that the weighted average debt as a 
percentage of total capital within the 
electronic industry is higher than within other 
type of industries. Therefore it is worth 
exploring the effect of the use of financial 
leverage on firm value of electronics 
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companies in Taiwan.  
Aiming at investigating whether 
application of financial leverage affects 
corporate performance or firm value of 
electronic listed firms in Taiwan, we apply 
threshold regression model to the observed 
“balanced panel data” to test if there exists an 
optimal Debt/Total Assets ratio (D/TA ratio 
hereafter) which may result in threshold 
effect and asymmetrical responses of the 
corporate performance to the D/TA ratio. If 
this “threshold” value of γ  is verified, the 
financial managers should take steps to 
increase debt levels in the low debt regime of 
D/TA ratio lower than the γ . Conversely, 
they should take steps to reduce debt levels 
in the high debt regime of D/TA ratio higher 
than γ .  
This paper contributes to previous 
literature in four aspects. First, we apply 
advanced panel threshold regression model 
developed by Hansen (1999) to test if there 
exists a “threshold” of optimal debt usage. In 
contrast with traditional linear model, this 
nonlinear threshold model can describes the 
“trade-off” between the benefits of tax 
shields of more debts and the disadvantages 
of costs from additional debts that may 
damage the corporate performance or value. 
Second, we consider panel data of electronic 
listed companies to fully examine the 
financial characteristics of the electronic 
industry and to solve the short period sample 
problem. Third, we use both accounting 
measurements of ROA, ROE and EPS and 
Tobin’s q to serve as proxies for firm value. 
Finally, four related control variables are 
considered to make our nonlinear function 
form more persuadable.  
The remainder of this paper is organized 
as follows: Section II describes the selected 
variables and data. Methodologies are 
introduced Section III. Section IV presents 
and analyzes the empirical results. Section V 
concludes this paper.  
II Data Description 
This paper explores if there exists an 
optimal D/TA ratio, which may result in 
threshold effect and asymmetrical responses 
of the firm value to the D/TA ratio through 
employing threshold regression model. The 
investigation has been performed using 
“balanced panel data” for a sample of 20 
selected electronic companies listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange during 1993 to 2002. 
A total of 200 observations are adopted for 
each variable considered.  
For the firm value, we choose 
accounting financial ratios: Return on Assets 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Earnings 
Per Share (EPS) as the indicators or proxy 
variables to evaluate the corporate 
performance or firm value. Besides, in order 
to consider the effect of market valuation of a 
firm, Tobing’s q, which defined as the ratio 
of the market value of a firm to the 
replacement cost of its assets, is also selected 
as the proxy variable for the firm 
performance or value. The calculations of the 
approximated q, following the suggestions by 
Chung and Pruitt (1994), is defined as 
follows: 
Approximated q = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA, 
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where MVE is the product of a firm's share 
price and the number of common stock 
shares outstanding, PS is the liquidating 
value of the firm's outstanding preferred 
stock, DEBT is the value of the firm's 
short-term liabilities net of its short-term 
assets, plus the book value of the firm's 
long-term debt, and TA is the book value of 
the total assets of the firm.  
There are two categories of explanatory 
variables in our panel data examination. The 
first is the threshold variable, which is the 
key variable to be investigated whether there 
exists an asymmetric threshold effect of the 
financial leverage on firm value. The debt to 
total assets ratio (D/TA Ratio) is selected as 
the indicator for the debt usage of the firms 
since it is widely used in the literature. 
Second category of explanatory variable is 
the control variables, which we adopt to 
make our function form more persuadable. In 
this paper, four control variables, including 
dividend payout ratio, management 
ownership ratio, growth rate of total assets, 
and switch-out investment ratio, which are 
presumed to have influences upon the firm 
value, are applied in our examination. All 
data sets are obtained from Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ) Data Bank of 
Taiwan. 
IV Empirical Results 
1. Panel Unit Root Models 
 The result of the stationary test for each 
panel (explained variables, threshold variable, 
and control variables) is represented in Table 
1. It shows that all the variables are most 
likely to be presumed to carry stationary 
characteristics since the null of unit root are 
mostly rejected, especially in the findings 
from LLC test. These stationary findings 
enable us to go further estimations of the 
panel threshold regression.     
 
2. Panel Threshold Regressive Model 
This paper applies the threshold theory 
proposed by Hansen (1999) and assumes that 
debt ratio and corporate performance have 
asymmetric nonlinear relationship. First we 
test if there exists threshold effect. We test 
double threshold and single threshold effect, 
respectively, and the formulas for both 
models are as follows: 
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The dependent variable itv  represents 
corporate performance or firm value, which 
uses ROA, ROE, EPS, and Tobin’s q as 
proxies, respectively. The independent 
variable itd  represents debt ratio (D/TA 
ratio), which is indeed the threshold variable. 
ith  is a control variable vector that contains 
four variables of dividend payout ratio, 
management ownership ratio, growth rate of 
total assets, and switch-out investment ratio. 
Besides, iµ , the fixed effect, represents the 
heterogeneity of companies under different 
operating conditions. The errors itε  is 
assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed with mean zero and finite 
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variance 2σ ( 2~ (0, )it iidε σ ). i and t are 
symbols for firms and time periods.  
This paper follows the bootstrap 
method to get the approximation of F statistic 
and then calculate the p-value. Table 4 
presents the empirical results of test for both 
single threshold and double threshold effects. 
After repeating bootstrap procedure 200 
times for each of the two panel threshold 
tests, we find that the tests for double 
threshold are all statistically insignificant for 
any of the dependent variables-ROA, ROE, 
EPS, or Tobin’s q served as the proxy 
variable of the firm value. However, the 
significant finding at the 10% level with a 
bootstrap p-value of 0.06 occurs only when 
Tobin’s q is selected as the proxy for firm 
value in the testing of single threshold. We 
thus conclude that there exists a single 
threshold effect of the debt ratio on firm 
value when Tobin’s q is selected. For the 
remainder of the analysis we work with this 
single threshold model.  
When there exists a single threshold 
effect of the debt ratio on firm value, all 
observations are split into two regimes, a low 
debt level and a high debt level, depending 
on whether the threshold variable itd  is 
smaller or larger than the threshold value (γ ). 
The regimes are distinguished by differing 
regression slopes, 1α  and 2α . Table 5 
represents the regression slope estimates 
together with the conventional OLS standard 
errors and White-corrected standard errors 
for two regimes. 
The estimated model from above empirical 
findings can be expressed as follows: 
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 The estimated threshold value ( γ ) is 
37.84%, and thus all of the observations can 
be divided into two regimes depending on 
whether the D/TA ratio is smaller or larger 
than the threshold value. Two coefficients 
( 1α = 0.1848 and2α = 0.0319) are all positive 
with the evidence that the 1α  in the low 
debt level is significant, while the 2α  in the 
high debt level is not. 
This paper further investigates the influences 
of four control variables upon the firm value. 
The empirical results are observed in Table 6, 
which shows that only switch-out investment 
ratio when ROA is selected as the proxy for 
firm value has significant negative impact on 
firm value. Among the findings when ROE 
and EPS are selected as proxy, no apparent 
relationships between all of the four control 
variables and firm value are observed. 
Finally, dividend payout ratio is shown to 
have significant negative relationship with 
the firm value when Tobin’s q is selected as 
the proxy for firm value.  
 
V Conclusion 
In contrast with traditional linear 
model, nonlinear relationship between 
variables is investigated in this study. We 
found out there exists single threshold effect 
between debt ratio and firm value only when 
Tobing’s q is selected as the proxy variable 
for the firm value. The estimated threshold 
value ( γ ) is 37.84%, while all of the 
observations can be divided into two regimes, 
a low debt level and a high debt level, 
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depending on whether the D/TA ratio is 
smaller or larger than the specific threshold 
value. Two coefficients ( 1α and2α ) are all 
positive with the evidence that the 1α  in the 
low debt level is significant, while the 2α  in 
the high debt level is not. This suggests that 
the financial managers should take steps to 
increase debt levels when the current debt 
percentage of total assets is below the 
threshold value of 37.84％; conversely, they 
should take steps to lower debt levels when 
the current debt usage is higher than the 
threshold value of 37.84％, for there is no 
further apparent net benefit due to the 
incremental leverage-related costs in the 
future. 
The empirical results of testing for the 
influences of four control variables upon the 
firm value indicate that only switch-out 
investment ratio when ROA is selected as the 
proxy for firm value has significant negative 
impact on firm value. Among the findings 
when ROE and EPS are selected as proxy, no 
apparent relationships between all of the four 
control variables and firm value are observed. 
Finally, dividend payout ratio is shown to 
have significant negative relationship with 
the firm value when Tobin’s q is selected as 
the proxy for firm value.  
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